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A reason-based theory of rational choice
Franz Dietrich and Christian List
London School of Economics
(October 2009, revised in April 2011)
Forthcoming in Nous
Abstract
There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philo-
sophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational
choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems
used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based
theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, ac-
cording to which an agents preferences are determined by his or her motivating
reasons, together with a weighing relation between di¤erent combinations of
reasons. By explaining how someones preferences may vary with changes in his
or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between de-
liberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the
theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to
respond to normative reasons.
1 Introduction
The idea that a rational choice is a choice based on reasons and that a rational agent
is someone who acts on the basis of reasons at least those reasons the agent takes
him- or herself to have is a very natural one, and yet reasons are largely absent from
modern rational choice theory. Instead, rational choice theory, also known as decision
theory, is paradigmatically Humean. A rational agent, on the standard picture, has
beliefs and desires (typically modelled as assignments of probabilities and utilities
to di¤erent possible worlds, states or outcomes), and acts so as to satisfy his or her
desires in accordance with his or her beliefs.1 On this picture, the agents desires over
We are very grateful to Charles Beitz, Richard Bradley, John Collins, Horacio Arló Costa, Tim
Feddersen, Robert Goodin, Martin van Hees, Brian Hill, James Joyce, Philip Kitcher, Isaac Levi, Dan
Osherson, Eric Pacuit, Rohit Parikh, Wlodek Rabinowicz, Olivier Roy, Teddy Seidenfeld, Michael
Smith, Laura Valentini, and Gerard Vong for helpful comments and discussions. We owe special
thanks to Selim Berker, John Broome, and Philip Pettit for detailed written comments.
1Classic contributions include John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), Leonard Savage, The Foundations
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possible worlds or fully specied outcomes his or her fundamental preferences are
volitional attitudes that are entirely separate from, and do not respond to, the agents
beliefs, which are cognitive attitudes. Only desires over prospects with uncertain
outcomes can change in response to belief changes about the relative likelihood of
these outcomes; these surface-leveldesires are also called derived preferences. The
assumption of xed fundamental preferences outside the realm of rational scrutiny
contrasts with the more common view of agency as involving the capacity to form,
revise and rationally pursue ones conception of the good, as Rawls famously describes
it.2 Standard rational choice theory focuses exclusively on the rational pursuit of an
agents preferences, and is silent on how these preferences are formed and how they
may be revised, for instance by deliberating about and responding to various reasons.
The aim of this paper is to present an alternative theory of rational choice, which
gives reasons their proper place.Of course, there is a large body of philosophical work
on the relationship between reasons and actions.3 But there is currently no formal the-
ory of rational choice that is reason-based.4 As a result, decision theorists and social
scientists engaged in the formal modelling of decision problems lack the conceptual
resources for capturing the role played by reasons in rational decision making. Simi-
larly, some important philosophical debates about reasons have not yet been cast in
of Statistics (New York: Wiley, 1954), and Richard Je¤rey, The Logic of Decision (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1965/1983). Savage denes probabilities over states of the world, utilities over
outcomes of actions in them; Je¤rey denes both probabilities and utilities over possible worlds.
2See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
3 Important works include Derek Part, Reasons and Persons (New York: Oxford University Press,
1984), Thomas Scanlon,WhatWeOwe to EachOther (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 1998),
JosephRaz,Practical Reason andNorms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), and the essays in R.
JayWallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Sche­ er and Michael Smith (eds.),Reason and value: themes from
the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), notably John Broomes
chapter, Reasons, pp. 28-55. See also the surveys by Stephen Finlay andMark Schroeder, Reasons for
Action: Internal vs. External(2008), James Lenman, Reasons for Action: Justication vs. Explana-
tion(2009), and Michael Ridge, Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative(2005), in
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/).
4Works pertaining to, but not framed in terms of, reasons include Ralph Keeney and Howard
Rai¤as multi-attribute utility theory in Decisions with Multiple Objectives (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), Isaac Levis work on unresolved value conicts in Hard Choices (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), and works on awareness, e.g., Brian Hill, Awareness Dy-
namics, Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (2) (2010), pp. 113-137. In Rationalization(University of
Pennsylvania, 2008), Vadim Cherepanov, Timothy Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni generalize stan-
dard rational choice theory to account for what they call rationalization: agents have xed underlying
preferences but make choices they can rationalize, e.g., justify in public. Their model remains close
to standard rational choice theory in that the assumption of xed fundamental preferences is not
lifted. Relatedly, Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti, in Sequentially Rationalizable Choice, Amer-
ican Economic Review 97 (5) (2007), pp. 1824-1839, model how human choices may result from the
application of multiple choice heuristics. Some of our concerns are also shared by Ariel Rubinstein in
his discussion in Economics and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) of how an
agents language may constrain his or her preferences, but he does not develop an account of reasons.
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formal terms.5 This is a signicant gap in the literature, which we here seek to ll.
At the core of our theory is a reason-based account of preference formation, which
can be roughly summarized as follows. An agents preferences over the relevant
fundamental objects (possible worlds, states, outcomes) depend on the reasons that
motivate him or her and may vary with changes in them. A motivating reason, as
we understand it, is a proposition that is motivationally relevant for the agents pref-
erences towards the objects of which it is true: it may a¤ect those preferences. (We
later contrast this with a normative reason, which is a proposition that is norma-
tively relevant for those preferences, constraining the preferences the agent ought to
have.) The relationship between motivating reasons and preferences is governed by
two axioms, introduced below, which are necessary and su¢ cient for a parsimonious
representation of those preferences across variations in the agents motivational state.
The preferences across such variations are then representable in terms of a sin-
gle weighing relation, a binary relation that ranks di¤erent possible combinations of
reasons relative to one another. It may rank, for instance, the combination I have
enough foodand I am healthyabove the combination I do not have enough food
and I am unhealthy; or the combination the economy is growingand there is no
war above the one in which only one of these reasons is present. The agent now
prefers an alternative, say a particular state of the world, to another if and only if
his or her weighing relation ranks the combination of motivating reasons true of the
rst alternative above the one true of the second. The two combinations of reasons
that are being compared characterize the two alternatives from the perspective of
the agents motivational state. In this way, the agents weighing relation, together
with his or her motivating reasons, determines his or her preferences. The weighing
relation can be interpreted in a number of ways, depending on ones philosophical
vantage point; our analysis is deliberately ecumenical.6
Our theory is both ambitious and exible. It not only captures the idea that an
important property of a rational choice is its responsiveness to certain reasons, but
it also shows us how changes in the set of reasons motivating an agent can lead to
changes in his or her preferences, even at the level of possible worlds or fully specied
outcomes, where standard rational choice theory denies such changes. Despite our
focus on the relationship between motivating reasons and actual preferences, our
5 In Reason and Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), Jon Elster conrms
this observation: Whereas the theory of rational choice has been elaborated and developed with
great precision, the same cannot be said of the idea of reason(p. 7).
6On a cognitivist interpretation, the weighing relation encodes a set of judgments about the
relative goodnessof di¤erent possible reason combinations; on a non-cognitivist one, it encodes
the agents dispositions to prefer some such combinations to others. In the rst case, the agent may
be taken to judge, e.g., that the combination I have enough foodand I am healthyis better than
its propositionwise negation; in the second, he or she may simply be disposed to prefer an alternative
instantiating the rst combination to one instantiating the second if the reasons are each motivating.
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theory can be reinterpreted to formalize the relationship between normative reasons
and the preferences an agent ought to have, thereby shedding light on some normative
questions.7 By suitably varying the interpretation of reasonsand preferences, our
theory can thus be put to positive as well as normative uses. In consequence, the
theory o¤ers novel resources for illuminating the relationship between deliberation
about reasons and rational choices, which in turn is relevant to many philosophical
and social-scientic questions. Furthermore, our theory generalizes standard rational
choice theory, entailing it as a special case, and therefore pinpoints precisely in what
sense the standard theory is at best incomplete.8
In Sections 2 and 3, we introduce some basic concepts alternatives, preferences,
and reasons and discuss what it means for a reason to be motivating. In Sections 4
and 5, we explain how our theory depicts an agents possible psychological states and
introduce our two central axioms on the relationship between reasons and preferences.
In Sections 6, 7 and 8, we present our main representation theorems and discuss
their interpretation. With this core of the theory in place, we comment on some
philosophical questions, rst, in Section 9, on the distinction between reason-based
explanation and reason-based justication and then, in Section 10, on the role of
reasons in an agents rational deliberation and on their relevance to the resolution of
disagreements between di¤erent agentspreferences. Finally, in Sections 11 and 12,
we add two technical extensions without which our theory would not be complete:
we show how it can handle preferences under uncertainty and explain how an agents
reason-based preferences relate to his or her choices. Proofs are given in an appendix.
2 Alternatives, preferences, and reasons
We consider an agents preferences over some fundamental objects of preference, which
we call alternatives. Depending on the area of application, the alternatives could be,
for example, possible worlds or states of the world, outcomes of actions, bundles of
goods, policy programmes, or election options. What matters is that the alternatives
are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the relevant space of possibilities.
Later we also consider preferences over general prospects, that is, probability distri-
butions over alternatives, so as to capture the fact that agents often do not choose
between individual alternatives, but only between di¤erent uncertain prospects, which
result from the actions they can take.
Let X denote the set of alternatives. The agents preferences over the elements
7The oughtinvolved allows various interpretations, such as ideally rationalversus moralones,
depending on what kinds of normative reasons we wish to capture.
8For a discussion of some limitations of standard rational choice theory, supporting our current
perspective, see Philip Pettit, Decision Theory and Folk Psychology, in Michael Bacharach and
Susan Hurley (eds.), Foundations of Decision Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), pp. 147-175. See
further Pettits collection, Rules, Reasons, and Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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of X are represented by some order % on X.9 For any two alternatives x and y, we
write x % y to mean that the agent weakly prefers x to y. We further write x  y if
x % y but not y % x (a strict preference for x over y), and x  y if x % y and y % x
(an indi¤erence between x and y). Later we make explicit the way these preferences
a¤ect the agents choices or actions.
We are interested in how an agents preferences depend on his or her reasons.
There are a number of ways the concept of a reason might be formalized. Some philoso-
phers think of reasons as certain kinds of facts; others as certain kinds of properties
of the alternatives under consideration; still others as mental states of the agent.
In ordinary discourse, we tend to move between these di¤erent ways of representing
reasons, though sometimes with shifts in emphasis. When asked about our reason
for preferring Richard as our representative, for example, we might cite the fact that
Richard is trustworthy, or Richards property of trustworthiness, or our belief that
the person thereby preferred is trustworthy. For present purposes, we model reasons
as special kinds of propositions, as explained in a moment. Suitably interpreted,
propositions can capture facts, properties, as well as the contents of mental states.
To keep things simple, we dene a proposition as a subset of X; it is said to be true
of those alternatives contained in it, and false of all others.10 But our formal results
continue to hold if we drop the assumption that propositions are subsets of X and
dene them in another way  for instance, as sentences from a suitable language 
assuming they still pick out the alternatives of which they are true. Such an approach
would allow us to express two or more distinct things that are true of exactly the
same set of alternatives in X.
Now a reason is a proposition that has a particular kind of relevance for the agents
preferences towards the alternatives of which it is true.11 Depending on how we spell
out that relevance, we obtain di¤erent conceptions of a reason. A motivating reason
is a proposition that is motivationally relevant for the agents preferences: if true of
9Formally, % is a complete and transitive binary relation on X.
10This denition is standard when X is a set of possible worlds or states of the world. If X consists
of other objects (e.g., bundles of goods), subsets of X are conventionally called properties. It is a mere
terminological convention that we speak of propositions rather than properties in this paper, and our
analysis could equally be formulated in terms of properties. Setting aside subtleties, we can associate
any property in the conventional sense with the proposition, as understood here, that a given object
has that property (where the proposition is true of the objects that have the property, and false of
all others). Conversely, we can associate any proposition as dened here with the conventionally
understood property of satisfying the proposition. Our present terminology has some independent
advantages, including (but not restricted to) the representability of propositions by sentences.
11We thus focus on reasons for preferences, which then constrain choices or actions. Our analysis
can be adjusted so as to formalize reasons for choices or actions without preferences as intermediaries,
by translating our axioms below into constraints on the relationship between reasons and choice
functions. Needless to say, the use of any philosophically loaded concept, such as that of a reason,
in a formal theory requires some regimentation, which may not capture every established usage.
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an alternative, it may a¤ect the agents actual preference for the given alternative
vis-à-vis others. A normative reason, by contrast, is a proposition that is normatively
relevant for those preferences: if true of an alternative, it may a¤ect the preference
the agent ought to have for that alternative vis-à-vis others, whether or not he or
she actually has that preference. (The oughtcan be interpreted in various ways,
depending on the kind of normativity we wish to capture.) We deliberately leave
open how exactly a proposition must a¤ect or constrain the agents actual or ideal
preferences to count as a motivating or normative reason.12 This may depend on a
number of factors, including the context and which other reasons are present. Our
characterization theorems below provide a precise treatment of these issues.
If someone decides to go to a café because of a craving for co¤ee, one of her
motivating reasons is that co¤ee is available there. This proposition is motivationally
relevant for the agents preferences in that it a¤ects her actual preference for the
alternative of going to the café, of which the proposition is true. If someone prefers
to drive recklessly despite endangering himself and others, the proposition that his
driving is dangerous is a normative reason for him to give up this preference, even if
he is not motivated by this consideration. The proposition is normatively relevant for
his preferences in that it implies something for the preferences he ought to have: he
ought to disprefer an alternative reckless driving of which the proposition is true.
In what follows, we focus primarily on how an agents actual preferences depend on
his or her motivating reasons, although, as discussed later, our formal analysis can
be reinterpreted so as to capture the way an agents normative reasons constrain the
preferences he or she ought to have.
We write M to denote the set of motivating reasons for the agents preferences in
a given psychological state. It contains all propositions that play a role in the agents
preference formation over the alternatives in X. Thus M need not be a consistent
set: an agent can be simultaneously motivated by some reasons jointly true only of
x and others jointly true only of y, where these pull in opposite directions and need
to be weighed relative to one another. The set M simply captures the motivational
state in which the agent forms his or her preferences over the alternatives. It is, in
turn, a subset of some underlying set of possible reasons, which we call P. Nothing
much hinges on how permissively or restrictively we dene P, so long as it includes
at least those propositions that could become motivationally relevant for the agent.13
12 In our denitions, it su¢ ces to interpret may a¤ectas synonymous with is eligible to a¤ect.
More restrictive denitions are obtained by strengthening the wording to makes a di¤erence to.
13The set P could be the set of all propositions, but it could also be much smaller. This allows us
to capture a great variety of assumptions about which propositions are possible reasons. Our theory
is consistent, e.g., with dening P according to some psychological account of which propositions can
motivate someone, but also with including in P additional propositions that may serve as normative
reasons but are unlikely to motivate a given agent. Our theory is further consistent with the view
that P consists of all propositions that can be expressed by sentences of a particular form (e.g.,
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Examples of such propositions are there is war, there is food available, the dish is
poisonous, I am hungry, the power station has high CO2 emissions, and so on.
To indicate the dependency of the agents preferences on his or her set of moti-
vating reasons, we append the subscript M to the symbol %, interpreting %M as the
agents preference order in the event that M is his or her set of motivating reasons
in relation to the alternatives in X. Further, M represents the corresponding strict
preference, and M the indi¤erence relation.
3 Which reasons are motivating?
From a psychological perspective, not every possible reason pertaining to the alter-
natives in X will become motivating for an agent in a given context. This depends
very much on the agents psychology and the context in question. And from a nor-
mative perspective, not every motivating reason might be deemed appropriate. A
propositions capacity to motivate someone is quite distinct from its normative rel-
evance, and thus motivating reasons and normative reasons can come signicantly
apart. Someone might be psychologically motivated by reasons which, normatively
speaking, we nd utterly deplorable. Conversely, a given proposition might seem to
be a compelling normative reason for or against something from a third-person per-
spective or from the perspective of some background normative theory and yet it
may fail to motivate an agent. Since our primary aim is to develop a positive theory
of rational choice, we focus on how an agents motivating reasons explain his or her
preferences and choices, independently of whether these are also normative reasons
justifying them. Later, however, we return to the latter, normative concern.
There are many possible accounts of when a proposition attains motivational rel-
evance for an agents preferences.We need not commit ourselves to one such account
here, but just wish to hint at a few examples. According to a rst, rather simplistic
account, a proposition becomes motivating as soon as the agent conceptualizes it ab-
stractlyin the sense that, in his or her conceptualization of the world in the relevant
context, the agent distinguishes between those alternatives of which the proposition
is true and those of which it isnt. If our conceptualization of the world does not
distinguish between those states of the world in which the number of grains of sand
is even and those in which it is odd, for example, then the proposition that there
exists an even number of grains of sand cannot be a motivating reason that a¤ects
our choices.14 However, while the agents ability to conceptualize a given proposition
sentences with, or without, certain predicates, operators, or connectives), and even with the view
that P has certain closure properties (e.g., under conjunction or disjunction).
14Generally, the agents conceptualization of the world may be more coarse-grained than that of a
well-informed observer. The agent might only distinguish between non-singleton equivalence classes
of alternatives rather than between individual alternatives. In this case, only propositions expressible
as unions of such equivalence classes would be conceptualized by the agent. According to Axiom 1
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seems necessary for it to gain motivational relevance, it may not be enough.
On a second account, a proposition becomes motivating only when the agent qual-
itativelyand not merely abstractlyunderstands it. A policy maker, for example,
may abstractly understand that di¤erent foreign policies can be distinguished from
each other with respect to whether or not they make cheap oil available and whether
or not they lead to war, but fail to understand qualitatively what a war involves
and thus fail to be motivated by the latter consideration. This account of how a
proposition becomes motivating requires that the distinction between abstract con-
ceptualization and qualitative understanding can be meaningfully made  an issue
which is partly philosophical and partly psychological. We ag it here as something
that merits further investigation.
A third account draws on the concept of attentional salience as frequently used
in psychology and behavioural economics. Among those propositions abstractly con-
ceptualized by an agent and perhaps even understoodin some stronger, qualitative
sense, only some are typically salient for the agent, in that the agent focuses on them
or uses them as heuristicsor criteria in forming his or her preferences. Now the idea
is that a proposition becomes motivating for an agent if and only if he or she focuses
on it actively or uses it as a preference-formation heuristic or criterion. This account
is consistent with the commonly made psychological assumption that the agent is
boundedly rational, that is, unable or at least unlikely to give full and simultane-
ous attention to everything he or she conceptualizes or understands.15 The account
can also accommodate the important possibility that the agent actively engages in
normative reection on which propositions to take into account in forming his or
her preferences. He or she might ask him- or herself which propositions are genuine
normative reasons; we return to this possibility in our discussion of deliberation.
Developing each of these illustrative accounts of the sources of motivation in more
detail is beyond the scope of this paper, and other accounts can be found in the
philosophical literature. Whichever account we adopt, however, the basic idea that
an agents preferences depend on his or her motivating reasons is a very natural one.
4 The psychological states of an agent
From a third-person perspective, a full theory of an agent requires the ascription of
an entire family of preference orders to that agent, consisting of one preference order
%M for each psychologically possible set of motivating reasons M . As we have noted,
below, the agent would then be indi¤erent between alternatives in the same equivalence class.
15A prominent account of rational choice based on heuristics has been developed by Gerd Gigeren-
zer, Peter M. Todd and the ABC Group, Simple heuristics that make us smart (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999). See also Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten (eds.), Bounded rationality:
The adaptive toolbox (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
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each such set corresponds to a particular motivational state of the agent, and in any
such state, the agent holds only one preference order. What the reference to an entire
family of preference orders captures is the idea that the agent may have a disposition
to change his or her preferences in certain ways when his or her motivational state
changes. The policy maker in our earlier example may prefer an invasion of an oil-
producing country to an investment in renewable resources if he or she is motivated
only by whether the policy supports current consumption levels of cheap oil. This
preference may change, however, if he or she becomes motivated also by whether the
policy leads to war. Of course, the agent him- or herself need not and typically will
not be consciously aware of the entire family of preference orders ascribed to him
or her by our theory. But from a theoretical perspective, we would like to account
for the agents preferences across variations in his or her motivational state.
In order to ascribe to the agent one preference order %M for each possible set
of motivating reasons M , we must specify what the possible such sets are. In other
words, we must say something about what psychological states the agent can be in. In
the simplest case, every subset of P, the underlying set of possible reasons, constitutes
a possible motivating set. But we have already noted that there may be psychological
constraints on which propositions can motivate an agent, and under what conditions,
and as a result, not every subset of P needs to be a possible specication of M .
For instance, some propositions may never motivate the agent in conjunction with
certain others. Some reasons may crowd out others, such as economic self-interest
driven reasons versus charitable ones. Similarly, there may be propositions that can
motivate the agent only in conjunction with certain others, and so on.
Thus, in the general case, the set of all possible sets of motivating reasons, which
we callM, may be smaller than the set of all subsets of P. For expositional simplicity,
we make a regularity assumption about the possible sets of motivating reasons:
Regularity assumption. The di¤erent possible sets of motivating reasons (that
is, the elements ofM) form a lattice, that is:
(i) if M1 and M2 are possible sets of motivating reasons, then so is M1 \M2 (that
is,M is closed under intersection);
(ii) if M1 and M2 are possible sets of motivating reasons, then so is M1 [M2 (that
is,M is closed under union).
In the baseline case in which all subsets of P are possible sets of motivating
reasons, this regularity assumption is trivially satised. In fact, our formal analysis
requires only something weaker than this assumption. Theorem 1 below and its
subsequent extension 1* use only part (i), and Theorem 2 and its extension 2* use
only a weakened variant of part (ii).16 Thus the crowding-outor crowding-ine¤ects
16This weakened variant requires that if M1 and M2 are possible sets of motivating reasons, then
so is some superset of M1 [M2. This is satised, e.g., if P is a possible motivating set.
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we have referred to can be captured by our analysis.17
5 Two axioms on reasons and preferences
We are now in a position to introduce our two central axioms on the relationship
between an agents set of motivating reasons and his or her preferences. The idea
underlying both axioms is that an agents preference for or against an alternative
as compared with others is driven by the motivating reasons that are true of the
alternative. The rst axiom concerns the case in which the exact same motivating
reasons are true of a given pair of alternatives.
Axiom 1. The agent is indi¤erent between any pair of alternatives of which the
same motivating reasons are true. Formally, for any x and y in X and any M inM,
if fR 2M : R is true of xg = fR 2M : R is true of yg, then x M y.
Axiom 1 is true almost by denition under two of our three illustrative accounts
of when a proposition becomes motivating for the agent. Consider the conceptualiza-
tionaccount. If the set of propositions motivating the agent coincides with the set of
propositions he or she conceptualizes abstractly, then the agent does not distinguish
between alternatives that di¤er at most with respect to propositions that are not mo-
tivating reasonsthese propositions are not conceptualizedand hence indi¤erence
between such alternatives is natural.18 Similarly, consider the attentional salience
account. Suppose the agent gives no attention to any propositions that do not mo-
tivate him or her or does not use them as preference-formation heuristics or criteria,
either due to cognitive limitations or because he or she has explicitly set them aside.
Then it is only natural that he or she will be indi¤erent between alternatives that
di¤er at most with respect to such non-motivating propositions. Under the remain-
ing illustrative account of the sources of motivation, the qualitative understanding
account, Axiom 1 becomes a substantive and we think interesting psychological
hypothesis. Here the axiom says that an agents preferences between alternatives
are fully determined by those properties of the alternatives the agent qualitatively
understands, while any properties not understood in this manner make no di¤erence.
Axiom 2 concerns the case in which the agents set of motivating reasons in relation
to the alternatives in X grows, but none of the newly added reasons is true of a given
pair of alternatives x and y.
17By suitably amending our axioms below, we can also say something about the case in which
neither part of the assumption holds, but we do not discuss the details here.
18 Indi¤erence follows strictly under the following conditions: (i) the agent distinguishes only be-
tween possibly non-singleton equivalence classes of alternatives, so that his or her preferences over
individual alternatives are induced by preferences over these equivalence classes, and (ii) his or her
motivating reasons are precisely the propositions expressible as unions of such equivalence classes.
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Axiom 2. If additional reasons become motivating for the agent, but none of them
are true of a given pair of alternatives, then the agents preference over that pair
remains unchanged. Formally, for any x and y in X and any M and M 0 inM with
M 0 M , if no R in M 0nM is true of x or y, then x %M y , x %M 0 y.
This implies, for example, that if the proposition Bordeaux wine is served at
dinnerattains motivational relevance for the agent, this does not a¤ect his or her
preference between any two dinner plans not involving any wine. The axiom is plausi-
ble under each of our three illustrative accounts of the sources of motivation, especially
in light of the idea that an agents preferences between alternatives are driven by the
motivating reasons that are true of those alternatives.
Apparent counterexamples to Axiom 2, that is, preference changes seemingly
driven by the addition of reasons not true of any of the alternatives in question,
typically involve an under-specication of the reasons that are being added to the
agents motivating set. To illustrate, consider the following apparent counterexam-
ple. An agent prefers having dinner at McDonalds to dining at an organic vegan
teetotalersrestaurant. But when he adopts the proposition Bordeaux wine is served
at dinneras a further motivating reason in deliberating about the alternatives, this
prompts in him a more sophisticated attitude towards food and thereby reverses his
preference between McDonalds and the organic alternative. Since neither restau-
rant is licenced to serve any wine, Axiom 2 appears to be violated by this preference
change. This appearance, however, rests on an under-specication of the additional
motivating reasons that lead to the agents new psychological state. Implicit in the
example is the thought that, along with the proposition Bordeaux wine is served at
dinner, a second proposition such as the food is sophisticatedhas also become mo-
tivationally relevant, and it is the latter reason that is responsible for the preference
change. This is consistent with Axiom 2, since one of the two dinner options o¤ers
sophisticated food.
6 A general representation of reason-based preferences
What is the consequence of the two axioms we have introduced? Our rst repre-
sentation theorem shows that, if (and only if) an agent satises them, his or her
preferences across all variations in motivating reasons can be parsimoniously repre-
sented in terms of a single binary relation, to be called a weighing relation, which
ranks di¤erent possible combinations of reasons relative to one another. Formally, a
possible combination of reasons is a consistent subset of P, such as the set of propo-
sitions I have enough foodand I am healthy. (A set of propositions is consistent
if there is an alternative x in X of which all the propositions in it are true.)
Theorem 1. The agents preference orders %M across all variations in the set of
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motivating reasons M in M satisfy Axioms 1 and 2 if and only if there exists a
weighing relation, denoted , over all possible combinations of reasons such that, for
each M inM,
x%M y , fR2M :R is true of xgfR2M :R is true of yg for all x,y in X.
Informally, the weighing relation whose existence is ensured by the two axioms
delivers the agents preferences as follows: in any motivational state, the agent prefers
an alternative x to another alternative y if and only if the weighing relation ranks
the combination of motivating reasons true of x above the combination of motivating
reasons true of y. The two combinations of reasons that are being weighed relative
to each other can be interpreted as characterizing x and y through the lens of the
agents motivational state.
Before we turn to the interpretation of this relation, it is useful to give an example.
Consider a simple case in which there are only four possible alternatives over which
the agent has preferences:
Health care is available to everyone and cheap for me (ac).
Health care is not available to everyone but cheap for me (:ac).
Health care is available to everyone but not cheap for me (a:c).
Health care is neither available to everyone nor cheap for me (:a:c).
For simplicity, suppose, further, there are only two possible reasons in P, namely
A : health care is available to everyone (formally fac; a:cg), and
C : health care is cheap for me (formally fac;:acg),
but any set of them can be motivating, that is,M consists of all subsets of P. Now
imagine that the agents preferences across variations in his or her motivating reasons
are as follows:
M = fA;Cg ! ac M a:c M :ac M :a:c;
M = fAg ! ac M a:c M :ac M :a:c;
M = fCg ! ac M :ac M a:c M :a:c;
M = ? ! ac M a:c M :ac M :a:c:
One can verify that these preferences do indeed satisfy Axioms 1 and 2, so that our
theorem applies. What, then, does the agents weighing relation look like? It is easy
to check that the agents family of preference orders just displayed can be represented
by a single weighing relation  over possible reason combinations that satises
fA;Cg > fAg > fCg > ?;
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where > denotes the strict relation induced by . Thus the reason combination
fA;Cg is ranked rst, the combination fAg second, the combination fCg third, and
the empty combination last, which captures a particular way of weighing these pos-
sible combinations of reasons relative to each other.
But how can the agents weighing relation be interpreted? We can distinguish
between at least two broadly di¤erent kinds of interpretation. According to the rst,
which may be described as cognitivist, a weighing relation encodes a particular set
of judgments about the relative goodnessof di¤erent possible reason combinations.
Specically, S1  S2 is taken to mean that S1 is a (weakly) better combination than
S2. Depending on the precise variant of this interpretation, the truth-conditions of
these judgments, if there are any, may be either agent-independent or agent-dependent
facts about the goodness of di¤erent possible reason combinations. According to the
second kind of interpretation, which we may call non-cognitivist, a weighing relation
encodes the agents dispositions to prefer certain combinations of reasons to others
when the reasons contained in them are motivating. Here, S1  S2 is taken to
mean that the combination S1 is (weakly) preferred to the combination S2, assuming
all reasons in S1 and all those in S2 are motivating. Again, di¤erent variants of
this interpretation are conceivable, depending on what precisely is understood by a
preference over possible reason combinations.
Regardless of the interpretation adopted, our theorem shows that when the rela-
tionship between an agents set of motivating reasons and his or her preferences is
governed by our two axioms, these preferences can be parsimoniously represented in
terms of a single weighing relation whose relata are possible combinations of reasons.
Furthermore, this weighing relation is essentially unique. (It is unique on the pairs
of reason combinations needed to generate the agents preference orders across varia-
tions in motivating reasons.19) In short, our theorem delivers a simple representation
of what is by itself a rich structure, namely the agents family of preference orders
across all variations in his or her motivational state.
7 Is the weighing relation transitive?
Although we have considered di¤erent possible interpretations of the agents weighing
relation, we have not said anything yet about its formal properties. Most importantly,
is it actually an order over all possible combinations of reasons? In other words, is it
a complete and transitive binary relation? Completeness turns out to be not much
19These are all the pairs of reason combinations expressible as fR 2 M : R is true of xg and
fR 2M : R is true of yg for some x; y in X and M inM. The weighing relation is underdetermined
only with respect to those pairs of possible reason combinations that cannot be instantiated as true
of some actual alternatives in X and simultaneously motivating, and such pairs do not really matter
from the perspective of the agents rational choices.
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of a problem since the weighing relation can always be dened so as to (weakly)
rank all pairs of possible reason combinations. Surprisingly, however, the conditions
introduced so far do not guarantee that the relation will always be transitive, despite
the fact that all the actual preference orders generated by it are transitive. So how
can an intransitivity in the weighing relation occur, and when is it ruled out?
To address these questions, it is helpful to begin with an example. Consider an
agent who forms preferences over three types of cars available on the market:
a Monster Hummer, which is fast, big, but not environmentally friendly (fb:e);
a Sports Beetle, which is fast, not big, but environmentally friendly (f:be);
a Family Hybrid, which is not fast, but big and environmentally friendly (:fbe).
Thus, for the purposes of our example, any car available on the market has precisely
two out of the three characteristics: fast (f), big (b), and environmentally friendly
(e). Suppose, further, that a cars having any one of these characteristics can serve
as a reason for or against preferring it, that is, the di¤erent possible reasons in P are
F : the car is fast (formally ffb:e; f:beg),
B : the car is big (formally ffb:e;:fbeg),
E : the car is environmentally friendly (formally ff:be;:fbeg).
Moreover, we assume that any set of these propositions can be motivating, that is,
M contains all subsets of P. Now it is entirely conceivable that the agents family of
preference orders across variations in motivating reasons is the following:
M = fF;B;Eg ! Hummer M Beetle M Hybrid,
M = fF;Bg ! Hummer M Beetle M Hybrid,
M = fB;Eg ! Hybrid M Hummer M Beetle,
M = fF;Eg ! Beetle M Hybrid M Hummer,
M = fFg ! Hummer M Beetle M Hybrid,
M = fBg ! Hummer M Hybrid M Beetle,
M = fEg ! Beetle M Hybrid M Hummer,
M = ? ! Hummer M Beetle M Hybrid.
One can check without much di¢ culty that these preferences satisfy Axioms 1 and
2,20 and so, by Theorem 1, they are representable in terms of a single underlying
weighing relation  over possible reason combinations. But what is this weighing
relation? To be able to generate the agents preferences just displayed, it must have
all of the following properties:
20This is straightforward in the case of Axiom 1. To see that Axiom 2 is satised, note that the
structure of the example implies that if x; y in X, M in M and R in PnM are such that R is true
of neither x nor y, then x and y must be identical (x = y), so that x M y and x M[fRg y.
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fF;Bg  fB;Eg  fF;Eg;
fF;Bg > fFg > fBg;
fB;Eg > fBg > fEg;
fF;Eg > fEg > fFg;
fFg > ?;
fBg > ?;
fEg > ?:
Here  denotes the symmetrical relation induced by , and > denotes the strict
relation, as before. From the second, third and fourth lines, it follows immediately
that the weighing relation violates transitivity, since fFg > fBg, fBg > fEg, and
yet fEg > fFg. Of course, an intransitive weighing relation is harder to interpret
than a transitive one, particularly if one chooses to adopt a cognitivist interpretation.
The lesson to learn, however, is that the conditions used in our rst representation
theorem are simply not enough to rule out an intransitive weighing relation, though
they are fully compatible with an agents having a transitive such relation.21
What is the source of the intransitivity in the agents weighing relation in our
example? Imagine that, contrary to the assumptions made, there existed additional
cars of which precisely one or none of the three possible reasons is true: one car that
is only fast (a Ferrari), one that is only big (an Old Diesel Van), one that is only
environmentally friendly (an Eco-Prius), and one without any of these properties (an
East German Trabant). Then the agents preference order over the di¤erent cars
when motivated by all three reasons would constrain his or her weighing relation to
rank all possible combinations of reasons, including the three singletons fFg, fBg
and fEg, transitively. The intransitivity identied in our example would disappear.
The counterfactual stipulation just made would give the agent a kind of Olympian
perspective from which he or she would be able to consider one alternative corre-
sponding to each possible combination of reasons, which instantiates all and only the
reasons in it, and thereby to rank all these sets transitively. Generalizing from this
observation, we can conjecture that an intransitivity in the agents weighing relation
can occur precisely if this Olympian perspective is not available.
Our second representation theorem conrms this conjecture. Call the set P of
possible reasons weakly independent if every consistent subset S of P, representing a
possible reason combination, can be instantiated precisely : there is an alternative x in
21An intransitivity in the weighing relation does not give rise to an intransitivity in the agents
preferences, provided these are dened relative to a xed set of motivating reasons. If the consider-
ation of di¤erent pairs of alternatives changed the set of motivating reasons, an intransitivity might
surface. This would happen, e.g., if the comparison of f:be and :fbe made the set fF ,Bg motivating
(leading to a preference for f:be over :fbe), the comparison of :fbe and fb:e made fF ,Eg mo-
tivating (leading to a preference for :fbe over fb:e), and the comparison of fb:e and f:be made
fB,Eg motivating (leading to a preference for fb:e over f:be).We return to this issue in Section 12.
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X of which, among the possible reasons in P, precisely those in S, and no others, are
true. To illustrate, weak independence is violated in our example of the three cars:
although each of the singleton sets fFg, fBg and fEg (as well as the empty set) is
consistent, thereby representing a possible combination of reasons, no cars instantiate
any of these combinations precisely. By contrast, in the augmented example in which
cars instantiating them are stipulated to exist, weak independence is satised.
Theorem 2. Suppose the set of possible reasons P is weakly independent. Then the
agents preference orders %M across all variations in the set of motivating reasons M
inM satisfy Axioms 1 and 2 if and only if there exists a weighing order (a complete
and transitive weighing relation), denoted , over all possible combinations of reasons
such that, for each M inM,
x%M y , fR2M :R is true of xgfR2M :R is true of yg for all x,y in X.
This theorem conrms that in our example of the three cars the lack of weak
independence of the set of possible reasons is indeed to blame for the unavailability of
the Olympian perspective needed to ensure a transitive weighing relation. Conversely,
the satisfaction of weak independence, as in the augmented car example, is enough
to guarantee the transitivity of the weighing relation. As in our earlier representation
theorem, the weighing relation now a weighing order is essentially unique.
8 Additive weighing of reasons
It is worth drawing attention to an important special case of an agent who is rational
in the sense of our theory, and to whom our representation results therefore apply.
Consider an agent whose reason-based preference formation works as follows. The
agent implicitly assigns a particular numerical weight to each of the possible reasons
in P. Some possible reasons get assigned a positive weight, others a negative one.
For example, the proposition there is peacewill presumably have a positive weight
(counting in favour of any alternative of which it is true), each of the propositions
there is not enough food availableand I am hungrya negative one (counting against
any alternative of which it is true). Now the agent prefers an alternative to another
just in case the sum-total of the weights of the reasons true of the rst alternative and
motivating for him or her exceeds the same sum-total for the second. In each case,
the sum-total encompasses reasons with a positive weight as well as reasons with a
negative one.
To describe this process formally, we introduce a function w which assigns to each
possible reason R in P a real number w(R), interpreted as the weight of R. Of course,
this function may di¤er from agent to agent. For each set of motivating reasons M
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inM, the agents preference order %M is now given as follows:
x %M y ,
X
R2M :R is true of x
w(R) 
X
R2M :R is true of y
w(R) for all x; y in X.
Our two axioms are clearly satised here, and the agents weighing relation over
possible combinations of reasons can easily be derived from the weights assigned to
each of the di¤erent reasons contained in them. Specically, one such combination is
ranked over another by the agents weighing relation if and only if the sum-total of
weights assigned to the reasons in the rst combination exceeds that for the second,
or formally:
S1  S2 ,
X
R2S1
w(R) 
X
R2S2
w(R) for any consistent S1; S2  P.
To illustrate, recall our earlier example of the agent holding preferences over the
four alternatives corresponding to the di¤erent possible truth-value combinations of
the propositions health care is available to everyoneand health care is cheap for
me. In that example, the agents preferences and underlying weighing relation can
be represented in terms of the assignment of suitable weights to individual reasons.
We obtain a correct representation of the given preferences, for instance, by assigning
a weight of 2 to the reason health care is available to everyone(A) and a weight of
1 to the reason health care is cheap for me(C).
To be sure, an agent whose reason-based preference formation works like this
is only a special case of an agent as described by our theory, since, in the current
example, reasons have an additive separabilityproperty that they need not have in
general: in the case of separability, the weight the agent assigns to any motivating
reason is independent of what other reasons are motivating for him or her. In the
general case permitted by our theory, there is no such restriction.
Nonetheless, the separable case we have agged is important since the additive
balancing of reasons that goes on here captures what in philosophical discussions
is often described as the weighing of pro tanto reasons for and against some object
of choice.22 Indeed, it is only in the context of separability that any given reason
can unambiguously be said to count in favour of or against the alternatives of
which it is true. Without separability, the question of whether a reason counts for
or against those alternatives depends also on which other reasons are present. The
denial of separability is often described as particularismor holismabout reasons,
its a¢ rmation as generalismor atomism.23
22See, e.g., the discussion of pro tanto reasons in Broome, Reasons(op. cit.).
23For an excellent formal analysis of these views, see Campbell Brown, TheComposition of Reasons
(University of Edinburgh, 2009). See also Ridge, Reasons for Action: Agent-Neutral vs. Agent-Relative
(op. cit.). Although particularism/holism and generalism/atomism are usually dened as views about
normative reasons, analogous denitions can be given in the context of motivating reasons.
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9 Explanation versus justication
It is appropriate at this point to revisit the interpretation of our reason-based ap-
proach to the theory of rational choice. Although we have distinguished between
motivating and normative reasons, we have focused on the former, interpreting our
framework as capturing the relationship between an agents motivating reasons and
his or her actual preferences. This focus makes sense from a positive, social-scientic
perspective, from which we are primarily interested in explaining why agents make
the choices they make, and sometimes in predicting those choices. From a normative
perspective, however, we would also like to assess whether these or any other choices
are justied or at least whether they are justiable and whether the agent has
made them for the right reasons. To address these questions, we need to say more
about normative reasons. While reason-based explanations must refer to motivating
reasons, reason-based justications require a reference to normative reasons.24
As already mentioned but not yet developed, our formal framework can be rein-
terpreted to address the relationship between an agents normative reasons and the
preferences he or she ought to have, rather than the relationship between an agents
motivating reasons and his or her actual preferences, on which we have focused so far.
To sketch that reinterpretation, we must read the symbol % as representing the pref-
erence order the agent ought to have which we may call his or her ideal preference
order rather than the one he or she actually has. And to indicate that this ideal
preference order depends on the agents normative reasons, we must now append a
subscript N to %, interpreting %N as the preference order the agent ought to have in
the event that N is his or her set of normative reasons in relation to the alternatives
in X. Di¤erent accounts of what qualies as a normative reason for an agent, how
the oughtis to be understood (whether as a rational or a moral one, for instance),
and how the set N must be specied, correspond to di¤erent variants of this inter-
pretation.25 Once the interpretation is settled, however, our formal framework can
be taken to describe how the ideal preference order %N varies with variations in the
set of normative reasons N .
Just as the agents actual preference order can be represented as being determined
by the agents motivating reasons, together with his or her underlying weighing rela-
tion, so the ideal preference order can now be represented as being determined by the
relevant normative reasons, again on the basis of some underlying weighing relation.
Of course, this formal analysis does not settle the question of what the right normative
reasons are in any given context, or what weighing relation to use for ranking di¤er-
24On the distinction between reason-based explanation and reason-based justication, see also
Lenman, Reasons for Action: Justication vs. Explanation(op. cit.).
25On some accounts, N depends, at least partly, on what is accessible to the agent, so that, e.g.,
considerations not knowable by the agent cannot be normative reasons for him or her; on others, N
is independent of this question.
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ent combinations of reasons relative to one another. Di¤erent normative background
theories will give di¤erent answers to these questions. Our theory only provides a
formal calculus for linking normative reasons with ideal preferences, based on some
underlying weighing relation. But the theory can be supplemented with normative
constraints on the weighing relation, and with criteria for identifying the right set 
or the permissible sets of normative reasons in any given context.
Aided by this dual interpretability of our formal framework, we can return to
the distinction between reason-based explanation and reason-based justication. To
explain an agents preferences, we simply need to show that these preferences are
determined by the agents motivating reasons, on the basis of his or her underlying
weighing relation. We know from our representation theorems that, as soon as Axioms
1 and 2 are satised, such a reason-based explanation can always be given. However,
whether these preferences for example, the preference for x over y are also justied
depends on whether the agents actual set of motivating reasons is also the right
set of normative reasons  or at least a permissible such set  and whether the
agents weighing relation obeys the relevant normative constraints on how to weigh
di¤erent combinations of reasons relative to one another. When the agents actual
preferences are justied, they coincide with his or her ideal preferences, that is, with
the preferences he or she ought to have.
Recall our example of a policy maker who is deciding which foreign policy to
support. As we have noted, he or she may support the invasion of an oil-producing
country because this promises to make cheap oil available. But since it is hard to think
of any mainstream theory of just war that would deem an invasion permissible on
those grounds, the present case illustrates how reason-based explanation and reason-
based justication can come apart. While the prospective availability of cheap oil
constitutes a motivating reason explaining the policy makers preference, it is by no
means a normative reason justifying it.
We are also able to describe cases in which an agents preferences are at least
justiable, even when the more stringent conditions of actual justication are not
met. An agents preferences are justiable if there exist a right or permissible set of
normative reasons and an acceptable weighing relation that would give rise to those
preferences  more precisely, that would entail ideal preferences that coincide with
those actual preferences even if this is not the actual way the agent has arrived at
them. People often exploit this kind of justiability when they respond to criticism
of their choices or actions by ex post rationalization, that is, by pretending to have
been motivated by normative reasons that would have justied their choices when
these were not the actual motivating reasons.
In sum, our theory not only allows us to distinguish between explicable and jus-
tiable choices, and between choices made for the right and the wrong reasons, but
it also gives expression to the less commonly recognized possibility that an agent
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is motivated by the right normative reasons but governed by the wrong underlying
weighing relation, or that the agents being motivated by the wrong reasons mo-
tivating reasons that are not genuine normative reasons in the given context goes
along with his or her having the right weighing relation. While the distinctions be-
tween reason-based explanation and reason-based justication and between acting for
the right and the wrong reasons are familiar from the existing philosophical literature,
the role played by the agents weighing relation, and the additional complexities that
open up once we subject this to a normative assessment as well, are not made explicit
in the existing literature. It should therefore be evident that our proposed theory
o¤ers useful conceptual resources for addressing those under-researched issues.
10 Deliberation and disagreements
As our theory allows us to distinguish between reason-based explanation and reason-
based justication, it can also shed light on the role played by reasons in an agents ra-
tional deliberation about his or her preferences and on how reasons might be relevant
to resolving disagreements between di¤erent agentspreferences. Standard rational
choice theory, as we have noted, takes preferences over possible worlds or fully speci-
ed outcomes the alternatives in our theory to be fundamental and unchangeable
and thus cannot explain how deliberation, either within an individual or in a group,
could ever lead to any revisions of those preferences. Changes in preferences, on
this assumption, are only possible at the level of derived preferences over uncertain
prospects and must stem from changes in the agents beliefs about which outcomes
are likely to result from those prospects. By implication, when individuals engaged
in collective deliberation have di¤erent preferences, all they can do is to resolve any
informational di¤erences between them and, if this does not help to reach agreement
(because the disagreement was not due to di¤erent information), to aggregate their
conicting fundamental preferences into overall collective preferences. This, however,
does not resolve the individual-level disagreement; at best, it generates some collective
compromise. Furthermore, the process is notoriously vulnerable to the paradoxes and
impossibility results of aggregation familiar from social choice theory in the tradition
of Condorcet and Arrow.26
This standard picture fails to account for the possibility that an agents preferences
may change as a result of changes in his or her motivating reasons in relation to the
given alternatives. Such changes may, in turn, be prompted by various experiences
and especially by individual or collective deliberation. We can think, for example,
of a capitalist businessman who, after surviving a plane crash, consciously forms a
preference for a life devoted to charity over a life driven by income maximization, or
a workaholic who, after recovering from an illness, consciously abandons his or her
26Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New York: Wiley, 1951/1963).
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work-oriented preferences.27 Similarly, group deliberation may change participants
assessment of fundamental alternatives, for instance by making previously overlooked
aspects of those alternatives salient to them.28 Arguably, these agents have not merely
learnt new information although some of their beliefs may have changed along the
way but new reasons, such as other-regarding or non-economic reasons, have become
motivating for them.
Our reason-based theory of rational choice allows us to capture these phenomena.
It allows us to distinguish between information-based and reason-based deliberation,
and to acknowledge mixtures of the two. Information-based deliberation, as recog-
nized by standard rational choice theory, takes place whenever an agent rationally
revises his or her beliefs in response to new information or evidence, which may a¤ect
the agents derived preferences over uncertain prospects, but not his or her preferences
over fundamental alternatives. Reason-based deliberation, on the other hand, takes
place when the agent rationally revises his or her preferences at the fundamental level
in response to changes in his or her set of motivating reasons.29
On this richer picture, an agent can enter into a conscious deliberative process
with the aim of identifying which propositions to take into account in forming his or
her preferences over a given set of alternatives. Although someone not engaged in
explicit deliberation may sometimes nd him- or herself simply motivated by some
reasons rather than others, we need not assume that ones motivating reasons are
always outside ones control. An agent can deliberately interrogate him- or herself
about which propositions are genuine normative reasons for him or her in relation to
some alternatives, and thereby exercise some inuence over which reasons come to
motivate him or her.
The possibility of changing ones motivating reasons through deliberation is con-
sistent with each of our three illustrative accounts of when a proposition becomes
motivating, although the attentional salienceaccount arguably captures the role of
normative reection best. Let us begin with the conceptualizationaccount, accord-
ing to which a proposition attains motivational relevance for an agent as soon as he
or she conceptualizes it abstractly. In line with this account, deliberation may a¤ect
27For a more detailed discussion, see Franz Dietrich and Christian List, A Model of Non-
Informational Preference Change, Journal of Theoretical Politics (forthcoming).
28For related discussions, see David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, Political
Studies 40 (special issue) (1992), pp. 54-67; Jack Knight and James Johnson, Aggregation and
Deliberation: On the Possibility of Democratic Legitimacy, Political Theory 22 (1994), pp. 277-
296; John S. Dryzek and Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A
Reconciliation, British Journal of Political Science 33 (1) (2003), pp. 1-28; and Christian List,
Robert Luskin, James Fishkin and Iain McLean, Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility
of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from Deliberative Polls, working paper, London School of
Economics and Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy (2000/2007).
29For an earlier taxonomy of informational, argumentative, reective, and social aspects of delib-
eration, see Dryzek and List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy(op. cit.).
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an agents set of motivating reasons by rening his or her conceptual abilities, that is,
by helping him or her to distinguish between alternatives of which certain previously
unconceptualized propositions are true and alternatives of which they are not. But
since conceptualizing a proposition is not the same as judging that it matters norma-
tively, this account does not capture how normative reection in particular can a¤ect
an agents motivating reasons.
Next, consider the qualitative understanding account, according to which a
proposition becomes motivating for an agent when he or she qualitatively and not
just abstractly understands it. Although developing this idea would require further
elaboration, it is plausible that deliberation, at least when construed broadly, is not
restricted to the exchange of information or to abstract conceptual reasoning, but
that it can also make an agent imagine various scenarios vividly and thereby enhance
his or her qualitative understanding of some of the propositions true of those scenar-
ios.30 Think, for example, of how a startling personal report of someones experience
say, the experience of war can evoke in the listener a qualitative sense of what it
would have been like to go through that experience oneself. Like abstract conceptu-
alization, however, having a qualitative understanding of something is distinct from
judging that it matters normatively, and so this account equally fails to capture the
role of normative reection in shaping an agents set of motivating reasons.
Finally, in the case of the attentional salienceaccount of motivation, it should
be evident that deliberation can a¤ect an agents set of motivating reasons. If propo-
sitions motivate an agent when they are salient in the right way, then any activity,
such as deliberation, that involves giving careful attention to various propositions
can confer the required salience on some of them and de-emphasize others. More-
over, the variant of this account that ascribes to the agent active control over which
propositions to use in forming his or her preferences can also capture the idea that
normative reection may a¤ect the agents set of motivating reasons. It is an open
question whether, and how, deliberation may a¤ect not only the agents motivating
reasons, as argued, but also his or her underlying weighing relation. We need not
take a view on this issue here, except to mention it for further investigation.
The present observations suggest a more nuanced perspective on disagreements
between di¤erent agentspreferences. As we have seen, when agents disagree in their
preferences even after exchanging all relevant information, standard rational choice
theory o¤ers no further resources for resolving that disagreement except to apply
some method of bruteaggregation for arriving at some overall collective compromise.
Our theory, by contrast, allows us to identify whether the disagreement stems from
di¤erences in the agentssets of motivating reasons perhaps along with di¤erences
30For suggestions along these lines, see Iris Marion Young, Intersecting voices: dilemmas of gender,
political philosophy, and policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Robert E. Goodin,
Democratic Deliberation Within, Philosophy and Public A¤airs 29 (1) (2000), pp. 81-109.
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in their judgments on which propositions are genuine normative reasons or from
di¤erences in their underlying weighing relations, or both.
If it stems from di¤erences at the level of reasons, it falls under the scope of delib-
eration in the broadened sense of our theory. The agents can then deliberate about
which propositions are genuine normative reasons that should be used in forming
their preferences over the relevant alternatives, and if they reach agreement on this
matter, their original disagreement will have been resolved. But even if they cannot
agree on the right normative reasons, their disagreement will have been made more
tractable. Its source will have been identied, which means that it no longer needs to
be attributed to a brute di¤erence in tastes. Much of the recent debate in political
philosophy on the idea of public reasoncan be understood in these terms: the aim
is to come up with criteria for determining which reasons for and against the alterna-
tives are publicly acceptable that is, which reasons can be invoked to justify ones
preferences in public deliberation and which are not.31
If the agentsdisagreement stems from di¤erences in their underlying weighing
relations, on the other hand, the situation is more complicated. We have left it open
to what extent deliberation can a¤ect ones weighing relation, but it should be noted
that many debates in moral philosophy can be understood as subjecting that relation
to normative assessment as well. Such assessment takes place whenever the relative
importance or weight of di¤erent possible reasons is being discussed.
Drawing on these observations, our theory further allows us to suggest a new ap-
proach to the aggregation of preferences: reason-based preference aggregation. Here
each agents preference order would be treated not as a fundamental and unchangeable
input to the aggregation, but as being derived from two more fundamental inputs: a
set of motivating reasons or perhaps some judgments on what the right normative
reasons are and an underlying weighing relation. By making explicit and disentan-
gling these two determinants behind any preference order, the informational basis
for the aggregation would be enriched, which might allow us to nd more compelling
methods of aggregation. Although this proposal needs to be elaborated further, many
theorists of public reasonmay be attracted to the idea of aggregating preferences in
a way that is sensitive to the reasons behind those preferences.
11 Preferences over uncertain prospects
A satisfactory theory of rational choice must say something not only about an agents
preferences over fundamental alternatives possible worlds, states, or fully specied
outcomes but also about his or her preferences over uncertain prospects. An agents
objects of choice are often di¤erent possible actions, which correspond to di¤erent
prospects. Each action usually has several possible outcomes, and the agent is at
31See, e.g., Rawls, Political Liberalism (op. cit.).
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most able to assign probabilities to them. These probabilities normally represent the
agents beliefs about the likelihood of those outcomes, but they could also have an
objective interpretation. In this section, we show how our theory can be extended so
as to capture preferences over prospects in full generality. Less technically inclined
readers may skip this section without losing the overall thread of our argument.
Formally, a prospect is a probability distribution over the alternatives in X, that
is, a function P from the set X of alternatives into the interval [0; 1] whose sum-total
across all alternatives is 1.32 We write X to denote the set of all prospects. We now
assume that an agents preference order %M , for any set of motivating reasons M , is
dened not just over the alternatives in X, but over all prospects in X . Moreover,
we assume that, for each set of motivating reasons M , the agents preferences are
classical, in the sense that %M ranks prospects according to the expectation of some
utilityfunction from the set X of alternatives into the real numbers.
Again, we impose two axioms on the agents preferences. The rst is identical in
meaning to our earlier Axiom 1. This is because it quanties over all sure prospects,
where a sure prospect is one that assigns probability 1 to a single alternative x in X
and probability 0 to all others; it can thus be identied with that alternative x.
Axiom 1*. The agent is indi¤erent between any pair of sure prospects of which the
same motivating reasons are true. Formally, for any sure prospects x and y in X and
any M inM, if fR 2M : R is true of xg = fR 2M : R is true of yg, then x M y.
The second axiom quanties over all prospects, not merely the sure ones, but
otherwise matches our earlier Axiom 2. To state this axiom, we dene the probability
that a prospect assigns to a given proposition as the sum of the probabilities it assigns
to the alternatives of which that proposition is true.33
Axiom 2*. If additional reasons become motivating for the agent, but all of them
are assigned zero probability by a given pair of prospects, then the agents preference
over that pair remains unchanged. Formally, for any prospects P and Q in X and
any M and M 0 inM with M 0 M , if all R in M 0nM receive zero probability under
P and Q, then P %M Q, P %M 0 Q.
When the agents preferences satisfy Axioms 1* and 2*, two representation the-
orems hold, which are direct analogues of our earlier two theorems. Let us begin
with the analogue of Theorem 1, which provides a representation of the agents pref-
erences in terms of a single weighing relation, this time dened not over possible
combinations of reasons themselves, but more generally over probability distributions
32For simplicity, we require P to have nite support, i.e., P (x) > 0 for nitely many x in X.
33Formally, for any R in P, P (R) := P
x2X:R is true of x
P (x).
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over such combinations.34 Recall that, in Theorem 1, the preference between two
alternatives x and y was determined by comparing the two combinations of reasons
fR2M :R is true of xg and fR2M :R is true of yg, characterizing the two alternatives
from the perspective of the agents motivational state. In the extension to the case of
uncertainty, the preference between two prospects P and Q is determined by compar-
ing two induced probability distributions over combinations of reasons, which we call
PM and QM . These can be seen as the probabilistic generalizations of the two com-
binations of reasons compared in Theorem 1, this time characterizing the prospects
P and Q, rather than the alternatives x and y, from the perspective of the agents
motivational state. Specically, PM and QM assign to each possible combination of
reasons S the total probability (according to P and Q, respectively) of those alterna-
tives x in X for which the propositions in S are precisely the agents true motivating
reasons.35 In the special case in which P and Q are sure prospects and thus identi-
able with some alternatives x and y the induced distributions PM and QM assign
probability 1 to fR2M :R is true of xg and fR2M :R is true of yg, respectively. Now
the analogue of Theorem 1 can be stated as follows:
Theorem 1*. The agents preference orders %M across all variations in the set of
motivating reasons M in M satisfy Axioms 1* and 2* if and only if there exists a
weighing relation, denoted , over all probability distributions over possible combi-
nations of reasons such that, for each M inM,
P %MQ , PM QM for all P ,Q in X ,
where PM and QM are the induced probability distributions just dened.
While Theorem 1* shows that the satisfaction of Axioms 1* and 2* is enough to
render the agents preferences representable in terms of a single weighing relation,
we obtain a stronger representation when the set of possible reasons P is weakly
independent, as before. Recall that weak independence of P means that, for every
consistent subset S of P, representing a possible reason combination, there is an
alternative x in X of which, among the possible reasons in P, precisely those in S are
true. The analogue of Theorem 2 now yields a representation of the agents preferences
in terms of a weighing function, denoted W , over possible combinations of reasons,
34A probability distribution over possible combinations of reasons is a function from the set of all
possible combinations of reasons to the interval [0; 1] which sums to 1, where, as before, only nitely
many combinations of reasons are assigned non-zero probability.
35PM and QM are the projections of P and Q under the function that maps each alternative x in
X to the combination of reasons fR 2M :R is true of xg. For each possible combination of reasons S,
PM (S) =
X
x2X:
fR2M :R is true of xg=S
P (x) and QM (S) =
X
x2X:
fR2M :R is true of xg=S
Q(x):
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not just in terms of a weighing order  over them.36 Although such a weighing
function W induces a weighing order , which ranks probability distributions over
possible reason combinations according to their expected weight underW , it contains
more information than that order.
Theorem 2*. Suppose the set of possible reasons P is weakly independent. Then
the agents preference orders %M across all variations in the set of motivating reasons
M inM satisfy Axioms 1* and 2* if and only if there exists a real-valued weighing
function, denoted W , over all possible combinations of reasons such that, for each M
inM, %M ranks prospects in X according to the expected weight (according to W )
of the combination of true motivating reasons.37
Thus the extension of our theory to the case of preferences over general prospects
adds some further structure to the second representation theorem as compared with
its earlier counterpart. In Theorem 2 above, as noted, weak independence of the set
of possible reasons P ensured an ordinal representation of the agents preferences in
terms of a single weighing order over possible combinations of reasons. By contrast,
Theorem 2* yields a cardinal representation of those preferences in terms of a single
weighing function over possible combinations of reasons. The agents preferences
over prospects are then determined by the expected weight of the combination of
true motivating reasons under those prospects.
We can redescribe this representation in another way. For each possible set of
motivating reasons M , the weighing function W can be interpreted to induce a util-
ity function uM on the set of alternatives X. This utility function assigns to each
alternative the weight (according to W ) of the combination of reasons that are true
of that alternative and motivating, formally
uM (x) =W (fR2M : R is true of xg) for each x in X.
The agents preference order %M over prospects is then determined by the expectation
of that utility function for the given prospects, formally
P %M Q,
P
x2X
P (x)uM (x) 
P
x2X
Q(x)uM (x) for all P ,Q in X .
The present results demonstrate not only that our theory can represent preferences
over uncertain prospects as much as it can represent preferences over sure ones, but
36The weighing function W over possible combinations of reasons should not be confused with the
function w assigning weights to individual reasons in the additively separable case.
37This expected weight is the expectation of the induced utility function uM mapping each al-
ternative x in X to W (fR 2M :R is true of xg). The weighing function W is unique up to positive
a¢ ne transformations on the subdomain of those possible combinations of reasons needed to gener-
ate the agents preferences. Each of the functions uM (for all M in M) is unique up to the same
transformations on its entire domain.
26
also that it properly generalizes standard rational choice theory. Indeed, standard
rational choice theory emerges as the special case of our theory in which the set
M of motivating reasons is assumed to be xed and su¢ ciently large to impose no
restrictions on the assignment of utilities to individual alternatives.
12 From preferences to choices
Up to now, we have focused on the relationship between reasons and preferences
and left implicit how these relate to choices. To complete our theory, we need to
address this nal step. We concentrate once again on the positive interpretation of
our theory, considering the path from motivating reasons, via actual preferences, to
resulting choices, although our analysis can also be reinterpreted in normative terms,
so as to capture the path from normative reasons, via ideal preferences, to the choices
the agent ought to make.
The central observation is that the way decision theory formally relates preferences
to choices carries over to reason-based preferences. Any preference order, including
a reason-based one, induces a corresponding choice function. While a preference
order represents certain intentional attitudes towards a given set of alternatives, a
choice function encodes certain choice dispositions in relation to these alternatives.
It species which alternative, or alternatives, would (or on a normative interpreta-
tion, should) be chosen from any available subset of the alternatives. Formally, a
choice function, denoted C, assigns to each non-empty subset Y of X (of available
alternatives) a set of one or more chosen alternatives from the ones in Y .
Suppose, for example, an agent is faced with a choice between di¤erent fruits,
such as apples, bananas, and oranges. The agents choice function represents which
fruit(s) he or she would pick from any particular set of available ones, say from a
particular fruit basket he or she is presented with. The function might look like this:
C(fapple,banana,orangeg) = fappleg;
C(fapple,bananag) = fappleg;
C(fbanana,orangeg) = fbananag;
C(fapple,orangeg) = fappleg;
C(fappleg) = fappleg;
C(fbananag) = fbananag;
C(forangeg) = forangeg:
That is, if all three fruits are available, the agent will choose an apple; if an apple
and a banana are available, he or she will also choose an apple; if a banana and an
orange are available, he or she will choose a banana; and so on. The present choice
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function is easily explicable: the agent simply prefers apples to bananas to oranges
and always picks whichever fruit among the available ones is highest on this ranking.
Generally, any preference order % induces a choice function C as follows:38
C(Y )=fy 2 Y : y % x for all x 2 Y g for any non-empty subset Y of X.39
Crucially, by saying that a preference order inducesa choice function, we do not
settle the di¢ cult philosophical question of whether the relationship between prefer-
ences and choices is best understood as causal or explanatory. Our formal analysis is
neutral on this matter.
We can now ascribe to any agent modelled by our theory not only a family of
preference orders %M across the di¤erent possible sets of motivating reasons M in
M, but also a family of corresponding choice functions CM across all M inM. Each
choice function CM represents the agents choice dispositions in the event that M
is his or her set of motivating reasons in relation to the alternatives in X. (On the
normative reinterpretation, a choice function CN notice the subscript N would
represent the choice dispositions the agent ought to have in the event that N is his
or her set of normative reasons in relation to those alternatives.)
The resulting picture of rational choice should be clear: at any time, the agent
is in a particular psychological state, represented by his or her set of motivating
reasons in relation to the given alternatives, which, jointly with the agents weighing
relation, determines his or her preference order. This preference order then induces
a choice function, which encodes how the agent would choose from any concrete set
of alternatives. By implication, a change in the agents set of motivating reasons can
bring about not only a change in his or her preference order, but also a change in the
choice function and thus in the resulting choice dispositions. In this way, motivating
reasons can be viewed as motivating for preferences as well as for choices. (Similarly,
on the normative reinterpretation, the set of normative reasons constrains the choices
the agent ought to make, via determining his or her ideal preferences. Thus normative
reasons, according to our theory, can be interpreted as reasons for preferences as well
as for choices.) Using the technical tools from the previous section, this picture can
be further extended to choices under uncertainty as well, but for simplicity we set
these technicalities aside.
The picture just sketched, however, involves a simplifying assumption. By dening
the agents choice function CM on the basis of the preference order %M , we have
38Conversely, any choice function that represents su¢ ciently regular choice dispositions can be
explained in terms of an underlying preference order or other binary relation. For a classic exposition
of the relevant conditions, see Amartya Sen, Choice Functions and Revealed Preference, Review of
Economic Studies 38 (3) (1971), pp. 307-317.
39To be well-dened, C(Y ) must always be non-empty. This requires that, for each subset Y of
X, there is some alternative y in X that is maximal with respect to the preference order %. This
condition is trivially met if X is nite. It is also met if %=%M , as dened in this paper, and M is a
nite set of reasons, a plausible psychological hypothesis.
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implicitly assumed that the set of motivating reasons M is given independently of
the particular set of available alternatives to which the choice function is applied; it
is dened simply in relation to the set X of all alternatives, while the set of available
alternatives can be any subset Y of X. (In the normative case, a similar assumption
is implicit in dening an ideal choice function CN on the basis of an ideal preference
order %N for a set of normative reasons N that does not depend on the particular set
Y of available alternatives to which CN is applied.) Call this the case of exogenous
(motivating or normative) reasons. We obtain a more sophisticated, and perhaps more
realistic, picture of an agents choice dispositions by allowing the set of (motivating
or normative) reasons to depend on which alternatives are available. In other words,
di¤erent sets of available alternatives may endogenously activate di¤erent sets of
(motivating or normative) reasons.
Recall our example of an agent choosing between three di¤erent types of cars.
If the agents set of motivating reasons, which could be any subset of the car is
fast(F ), it is big(B), it is environmentally friendly(E), were exogenously given,
everything would be as in our example of choices between fruits: the choice function
over cars would look much like the one over fruits, just induced by the appropriate
preference order over cars instead of the one over fruits. But if di¤erent sets of avail-
able alternatives somehow activated di¤erent sets of motivating reasons, the agents
choice dispositions would be more complex. Suppose, for instance, that a choice be-
tween any two cars leads the agent to be motivated by all and only those reasons
that distinguish those cars. The agent may then exhibit cyclicalchoice dispositions.
In our example, he or she would choose the Sports Beetle (f:be) over the Family
Hybrid (:fbe) when presented with two environmentally friendly cars, the Family
Hybrid (:fbe) over the Monster Hummer (fb:e) when presented with two big cars,
and the Monster Hummer (fb:e) over the Sports Beetle (f:be) when presented with
two fast cars. The resulting choice function would not be explicable in terms of any
single preference order, since any such order would have to rank the Sports Beetle
over the Family Hybrid, the Family Hybrid over the Monster Hummer, and yet the
Monster Hummer over the Sports Beetle, a violation of transitivity.
While standard rational choice theory is unable to explain those kinds of choice
dispositions, let alone to rationalize them, our theory can account for them by pointing
to the way the reasons for those choices are a¤ected by the available alternatives 
or more generally, by the choice context. Such context dependence of preferences
and choices is widely recognized and seen by many as a serious challenge to rational
choice theory. By making rational choice theory reason-based as suggested in this
paper, we have therefore introduced some new conceptual resources for analyzing
this phenomenon as well.
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13 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a reason-based theory of rational choice, which responds to the
widely held concern that standard rational choice theory does not say anything about
the reasons underlying preferences but holds preferences to be unchangeable and not
subject to reason-based scrutiny. Our theory can be viewed from two angles. On the
one hand, it generalizes standard rational choice theory and thereby connects with the
large body of work in decision theory and the social sciences on the formal modelling
of human decision problems. On the other hand, it formalizes the role of reasons
in rational decision making, thereby capturing a core concern of the philosophical
literature on the relationship between reasons and actions.
Our theory should not be regarded as a rival to either body of work. Instead, our
aim is to promote a dialogue between formal rational choice theory and philosophical
work on reasons. Although we have only presented a rst sketch of our theory and
much further work is needed, we hope that the concepts and tools provided in this
paper will help to advance this enterprise.
A Appendix
We here prove Theorems 1 and 2. The proofs of Theorems 1* and 2* the extensions
to preferences over uncertain prospects  are signicantly more technical and are
available on request. Throughout our proofs, we write Mx := fR 2 M : R is true of
xg to denote the combination of reasons in a given set M  P that are true of an
alternative x in X, and we write S := fS  R : S is consistentg to denote the set of
all possible combinations of reasons.
The proof of both theorems uses the following lemma, which holds independently
of any assumptions on the setM of possible motivating sets.
Lemma 1. Suppose Axiom 1 holds. For all x; y; x0; y0 in X and all M in M, if
fR 2 M : R is true of xg = fR 2 M : R is true of x0g and fR 2 M : R is true of yg
= fR 2M : R is true of y0g then x %M y , x0 %M y0.
Proof. Let x; y; x0; y0 2 X and M 2 M such that Mx = Mx0 and My = My0 .
Applying Axiom 1 twice, we have x M x0 and y M y0. So, as %M is transitive,
x %M y , x0 %M y0. 
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
We rst prove necessity and then su¢ ciency of our two axioms for the representation
of preferences in terms of a weighing relation.
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A.1.1 Necessity of the axioms for the representation
First, suppose a binary relation  on S generates all preference orders %M across
M 2 M. Axiom 2 is obviously satised. As for Axiom 1, consider any M 2 M and
any x; y 2 X such thatMx =My. We have to show that x M y. As %M is reexive,
we have x M x. So, since  generates %M , we must have Mx  Mx. But since
Mx =My, this implies Mx My. From this again using the fact that  generates
%M it follows that x M y, as required.
A.1.2 Su¢ ciency of the axioms for the representation
Now assume that Axioms 1 and 2 are satised. Recall thatM is closed under nite
intersection. This is part (i) of our regularity assumption onM. There is no need to
assume part (ii) for Theorem 1.
Claim 1. For all x; y; x0; y0 2 X and all M;M 0 2 M, if Mx = M 0x0 and My = M 0y0 ,
then x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0.
To prove this claim, let x; y; x0; y0 2 X and M;M 0 2 M with Mx = M 0x0 and
My =M
0
y0 . AsM is closed under nite intersection, we have M \M 0 2M. We rst
show that
(M \M 0)x = (M \M 0)x0 =Mx =M 0x0 ,
(M \M 0)y = (M \M 0)y0 =My =M 0y0 :
To see that the rst set of identities holds, notice the following: rstly, Mx =M 0x0 by
assumption; secondly, (M \M 0)x =Mx, since (M \M 0)x =Mx \M 0x =Mx (the last
identity holds becauseM 0x  (M 0x0)x = (Mx)x =Mx); and, thirdly, (M\M 0)x0 =M 0x0 ,
since (M \M 0)x0 =Mx0\M 0x0 =M 0x0 (the last identity holds becauseMx0  (Mx)x0 =
(M 0x0)x0 =M
0
x0). The second set of identities holds by an analogous argument.
Now, since (M \M 0)x =Mx and (M \M 0)y =My, Axiom 2 implies
x %M\M 0 y , x %M y: (*)
Further, since (M \M 0)x0 =M 0x0 and (M \M 0)y0 =M 0y0 , Axiom 2 implies
x0 %M\M 0 y0 , x0 %M 0 y0: (**)
Finally, since (M \M 0)x = (M \M 0)x0 and (M \M 0)y = (M \M 0)y0 , Lemma 1
implies
x %M\M 0 y , x0 %M\M 0 y0: (***)
The equivalences (*) to (***) together imply that x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0. 
Claim 1 allows us to dene a binary relation  on S with the following properties:
for all S; S0 2 S, S  S0 if and only if x %M y for some (hence, by Claim 1, all)
x; y 2 X and M 2M such that Mx = S and My = S0.
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Claim 2. For each M 2 M,  generates %M , that is, x %M y , Mx  My for all
x; y 2 X.
To prove this claim, let M 2 M and x; y 2 X. First, assume x %M y. We show
that Mx  My, that is, x0 %M 0 y0 for some x0; y0 2 X and M 0 2 M with M 0x0 = Mx
and M 0y0 = My. This obviously holds: simply take x
0 = x, y0 = y, and M 0 = M .
Conversely, assume that Mx  My. Then, by the denition of  and Claim 1, we
have x0 %M 0 y0 for all x0; y0 2 X and M 0 2 M satisfying M 0x0 = Mx and M 0y0 = My.
In particular, x %M y. This completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
A.2 Proof of theorem 2
Assume a weakly independent set of possible reasons P. The proof is written so as
to maximize parallels with the proof of Theorem 1.
A.2.1 Necessity of the axioms for the representation
By the argument in the earlier proof, Axioms 1 and 2 hold if some order  on S
generates all preference orders %M , across M 2M.
A.2.2 Su¢ ciency of the axioms for the representation
Now assume that Axioms 1 and 2 are satised. Recall that, for any M;M 0 in M,
M contains some superset of M [M 0. This is a weakened variant of part (ii) of our
regularity assumption onM. There is no need to assume part (i) for Theorem 2.
Claim 1. For all x; y; x0; y0 2 X and all M;M 0 2 M, if Mx = M 0x0 and My = M 0y0 ,
then x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0.
This claim, although analogous to the rst claim in the proof of Theorem 1,
requires a di¤erent proof. Let x; y; x0; y0 2 X and M;M 0 2 M such that Mx =
M 0x0 and My = M
0
y0 . As M contains M;M 0, it contains some M 00  M [M 0, by
assumption. By the weak independence of P, there are a; b 2 X such that Pa = Mx
and Pb =My. Hence M 00a =Mx and M 00b =My, so that by Axiom 2
a %M 00 b, a %M b: (*)
By an analogous argument (performed on x0; y0;M 0 instead of x; y;M), there are
a0; b0 2 X such that M 00a0 =M 0x0 and M 00b0 =M 0y0 and
a0 %M 00 b0 , a0 %M 0 b0: (**)
Using Lemma 1, the right-hand side of (*) is equivalent to x %M y (becauseMa =
Mx and Mb = My); the right-hand side of (**) is equivalent to x0 %M 0 y0 (because
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M 0a0 =M
0
x0 and M
0
b0 =M
0
y0); and the left-hand sides of (*) and (**) are equivalent to
each other (because M 00a = M 00a0 and M
00
b = M
00
b0). These three equivalences together
with the equivalences (*) and (**) imply that x %M y , x0 %M 0 y0. 
Claim 1 allows us to dene a binary relation  on S, analogous to the one dened
in our proof of Theorem 1. But this time it is only a precursor to the relation we
ultimately wish to dene (it must subsequently be extended to an order). The relation
 has the following properties: for any S; S0 2 S, S  S0 if and only if x %M y for
some (hence, by Claim 1, all) x; y 2 X and M 2M such that Mx = S and My = S0.
Claim 2. For each M 2 M, the binary relation  generates %M , that is, x %M
y ,Mx My for all x; y 2 X.
The proof is analogous to that of the second claim in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Claim 3.  is transitive.
Consider S; S0; S00 2 S such that S  S0 and S0  S00. We have to show that
S  S00. Since S  S0, there exist x; y 2 X and M 2 M such that Mx = S,
My = S
0 and x %M y. Since S0  S00, there exist y0; z 2 X and M 0 2 M such that
M 0y0 = S
0, M 0z = S00 and y0 %M 0 z. Since M;M 0 2 M and by our assumption on
M, M contains some M 00  M [M 0. By the weak independence of P, there are
a; b; c 2 X such that Pa = S, Pb = S0 and Pc = S00, whence M 00a = S, M 00b = S0 and
M 00c = S00. Since x %M y, Mx = M 00a (= S), and My = M 00b (= S0), and by Claim
1, we have a %M 00 b. Similarly, since y0 %M 0 z, M 0y0 = M 00b (= S0), and M 0z = M 00c
(= S00), and by Claim 1, we have b %M 00 c. Since a %M 00 b and b %M 00 c, and by the
transitivity of %M 00 , we have a %M 00 c. So, by the denition of  (and using the fact
that M 00a = S and M 00c = S00), we have S  S00. 
Claim 4. There exists an order  on S that extends , in the usual sense that
S > S0 ) S > S0 and S  S0 ) S  S0 for all S; S0 2 S; equivalently, S  S0 ,
S  S0 for all S; S0 2 S that are ranked relative to each other by .
This follows from Claim 3 via a classic extension theorem for binary relations.40 
Claim 5. For each M 2M, the order  dened in Claim 4 generates %M .
To prove this claim, let M 2M and x; y 2 X. First, if x %M y, then Mx % My,
as  generates %M (by Claim 2), whenceMx My, as  extends . Conversely, if
x M y, then y M x (as %M is complete), so that My > Mx, as  generates %M
(by Claim 2). This implies that My > Mx, since  extends , hence that Mx 6My.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
40As proven in its most general form by K. Suzumura, Remarks on the theory of collective choice,
Economica 43 (1976), pp. 38190.
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